Temporal phenomenology: phenomenological illusion versus cognitive error

Synthese 197 (2):751-771 (2020)
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Abstract

Temporal non-dynamists hold that there is no temporal passage, but concede that many of us judge that it seems as though time passes. Phenomenal Illusionists suppose that things do seem this way, even though things are not this way. They attempt to explain how it is that we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. More recently, Cognitive Error Theorists have argued that our experiences do not seem that way; rather, we are subject to an error that leads us mistakenly to believe that our experiences seem that way. Cognitive Error Theory is a relatively new view and little has been said to explain why we make such an error, or where, in the cognitive architecture, such an error might creep in. In this paper we remedy this by offering a number of hypotheses about the source of error. In so doing we aim to show that Cognitive Error Theory is a plausible competitor to Phenomenal Illusion Theory.

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Author Profiles

Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
Andrew James Latham
Aarhus University

References found in this work

What Makes Time Special?Craig Callender - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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