Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61 (2006)
Any satisfactory account of freedom must capture, or at least permit, the mysteriousness of freedom—a “sweet” mystery involving a certain kind of ignorance rather than a “sour” mystery of unintelligibility, incoherence, or unjustifiedness. I argue that compatibilism can capture the sweet mystery of freedom. I argue first that an action is free if and only if a certain “rationality constraint” is satisfied, and that nothing in standard libertarian accounts of freedom entails its satisfaction. Satisfaction of this constraint is consistent with the universal causal predetermination of action (UCP). If UCP is true and the rationality constraint satisfied, there’s a sense in which our actions are explanatorily (though not necessarily causally) overdetermined. While it seems plausible (given UCP) that our actions are so overdetermined, it seems utterly mysterious why they should be so overdetermined. Compatibilism’s capacity to accommodate this mystery is a mark in its favor.
|Keywords||compatibilism freedom rationality explanatory overdetermination mechanism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.Neil Levy - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.
The Emergence of Reason From the Spirit of Mystery: An Inquiry Into the Origin and Nature of Ancient Greek Rationality.Apostolos L. Pierris - 2006 - Institute for Philosophical Research.
Compatibilism Evolves?: On Some Varieties of Dennett Worth Wanting.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):460-475.
The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.Peter van Inwagen - 1998 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 365-373.
Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #122,783 of 2,164,576 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,948 of 2,164,576 )
How can I increase my downloads?