Travis' sense of occasion

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):337–342 (2005)
Charles Travis promotes a conception of knowledge on which knowledge is unmistakable. I raise some issues about what he means by this. Though sympathetic to his project, I give reasons for doubting that he has shown that all knowledge depends on having proof
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00403.x
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References found in this work BETA
Charles Travis (2005). A Sense of Occasion. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alan Millar (2007). The State of Knowing. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.

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Similar books and articles
Charles Travis (2008). Viewing the Inner. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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Charles Travis (2005). A Sense of Occasion. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314.
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