What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?

In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125 (2001)
Abstract
"According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)
Keywords Evolution  Information  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Natural  Representation  Semantics  Teleology  Dretske, F
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DOI 10.1017/S135824610000713X
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How Do Natural Selection and Random Drift Interact?Marshall Abrams - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):666-679.
Fitness and Propensity's Annulment?Marshall Abrams - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
Teleosemantics Without Natural Selection.Marshall Abrams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.

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