Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56 (2015)
AbstractI argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. I show how the account, while circular, is not viciously so. It explains both how knowledge is a mental state, as well as the relationship between knowledge and justification, including justified false beliefs and Gettier cases. Moreover, although direct virtue epistemology is compatible with many views on the nature of belief, it can explain how knowledge might be metaphysically more fundamental than belief as well
Similar books and articles
Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Practical philosophy and the Gettier Problem: is virtue epistemology on the right track?Christian Piller - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):73-91.
On the Epistemology of Language.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):677-696.
Virtue epistemology, testimony, and trust.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):95-102.
Virtue epistemology: No new cures.Michael Levin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):397–410.
Getting Over Gettier.Alan Musgrave - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
Solving the Gettier Problem [major update required, draft work currently removed].Gregor Flock - manuscript
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.