The paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of Alexander Piatigorsky’s observational philosophy within the context of the confrontation between two versions of the transcendental project of man-in-the-world. The first project accentuates the invariant functional organization of cognitive systems by abstracting from bodily, affective and phenomenological realization of this organization. On the contrary, the second project emphasizes the phenomenological perspective of the experience of givenness, always already dependent on whose experience this is and how the cognitive system living this experience is organized. The first project can be called functionalist, and the second – phenomenological. Ontological and epistemological positions of these projects are specified in the problem of the observer, its status in the world and cognitive practice. The observational philosophy possesses an intermediate position between these two programs since, aiming to disclose the invariant structure of observation, it proceeds from the factual experience of the embodied subject placed into the situation of self-observation and observation of the other subject. It is concluded that Piatigorsky’s philosophy borrows from the functionalist project the commitment to self-objectivation and rejection from the spatiotemporal localization of cognitive activity. With the phenomenological project of enactivism Piatigorsky shares the aspiration to disclose the invariant cognitive structures during the empirical observation of the real enactment of cognitive agency, abandonment of substantialization of the self as well as the refusal from theoretical formulation of the problem of consciousness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.30727/0235-1188-2020-63-4-46-63
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,060
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.F. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-349.
Agonistic World Projects: Transcendentalism Versus Naturalism.László Tengelyi - 2013 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 27 (3):236-252.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Doświadczenie I Eksperyment W Sztuce.Alva Noë - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (1):259 - 273.
Theory and Observation in the Philosophy of Science.Dale Jacquette - 2004 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 7.
Experience and Experiment in Art.Alva Noë - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
Phenomenologization or Naturalization?Maxim D. Miroshnichenko - 2019 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (1):65-80.
The World Observed/the World Conceived.Hans Radder - 2006 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Agency and Observation in Knowledge of One's Own Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):148-161.
Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism.D. Lloyd - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):361-363.
First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology.Amie L. Thomasson - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 115-138.
The Epistemological Foundations of Scientific Observation.Vincent Israel-Jost - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):29-40.


Added to PP index

Total views
3 ( #1,279,866 of 2,403,823 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #550,507 of 2,403,823 )

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes