A Hierarchy of Armchairs: Gerald Gaus on Political Thought Experiments

Authors
Nenad Miščević
Central European University
Abstract
The paper places the work of G. Gaus into the tradition of political thought experimenting. In particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision by the heuristic device of idealized Members of the Public is presented as an iterated thought experiment, which stands in marked contrast with more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. The consequences are drawn, and issues of utopianism and realism briefly discussed.
Keywords Gaus  thought experiments  ethics   heuristics  veil of ignorance
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