A telescope for modal landscapes

Nenad Miščević
Central European University
How do we know what is metaphysically possible? Many philosophers agree that conceivability is our main, if not the only, guide to possibility. And attempts at conceiving various philosophically relevant scenarios lie at the heart of much of philosophical method. No wonder that the link between the epistemic and the modal has attracted a lot of attention. The present collection documents it on more than five hundred pages of densely argued text authored by some of the most creative philosophers in the area and published here for the first time. Meanwhile, Philosophical Studies have also published a thematic issue on the topic that reads like continuation of the collection, carrying the debate a bit further. We stay here with the collection.
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Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
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