Deep and superficial apriori

The paper challenges the entrenched equation of conceptual with apriori. It develops the idea of at least dual justification of a single piece of belief, at a deep, ultimate level and at the surface, immediately accessible to the thinker. Apriori justification then also admits of different degrees of depth. A proposition is deeply apriori for a cognizer if its ultimate ground is apriori, otherwise it is only superficially apriori . In the case of empirically applicable concepts, some of their concept-analyzing propositions are justified apriori only at the surface. Deeply, they are aposteriori, being originally straightforward empirical propositions. It is argued that there is no reason to suppose that they change their epistemic status once build into a concept.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
Marie-Luise Kalsi (1995). Apriori Concepts. Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):1-14.
Isidora Stojanović (2004). The Contingent A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):291-300.
Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
Laura Schroeter (2006). Against A Priori Reductions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

56 ( #87,117 of 1,924,709 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #254,650 of 1,924,709 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.