The Monist 81 (3):407-425 (1998)

Cheryl Misak
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
It seems that no philosopher these days wants a theory of truth which can be accused of being metaphysical. But even if we agree that grandiose metaphysics is to be spurned, even if we agree that our theory of truth should be a deflated one, the controversy does not die down. A variety of deflationist options present themselves. Some, with Richard Rorty, take the notion of truth to be so wedded to metaphysics that we are advised to drop it altogether. Others, with Paul Horwich, take the disquotational or equivalence schema—'p' is T if and only if p—to completely capture the content of the predicate 'is true'. And others argue that there is a conception of truth to be had which is non-metaphysical but which goes beyond the triviality expressed by the disquotational schema.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist199881322
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,848
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics.Jonathan Lewis - 2018 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 10 (2):1-21.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deflating Truth.Mark Richard - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:57-78.
Deflating Logical Consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Weak Deflationism.Matthew McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):69-98.
How Not to Think of Convergence on the Truth.Cheryl Misak - 1999 - Modern Schoolman 76 (2-3):133-140.
Deflating Compositionality.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):369–385.
Truth and Objectivity.Cheryl Misak - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):365-379.
Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.Hartry Field - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.
Deflating the Odes: Horace, Epistles 1.20.S. J. Harrison - 1988 - Classical Quarterly 38 (02):473-.
Deflating Meinongianism.Wen-Fang Wang - 2004 - In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 403--4.
Deflating “the Real”.Gary Calore - 1995 - International Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2):175-192.


Added to PP index

Total views
60 ( #171,809 of 2,432,825 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #464,144 of 2,432,825 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes