Cheryl Misak
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Abstract The success of the pragmatic account of truth is often thought to founder on the principle of bivalence?the principle which holds that every genuine statement in the indicative mood is either true or false. For pragmatists must, it seems, claim that the principle does not hold for theoretical statements and observation statements about the past. That is, it seems that pragmatists must deny objective truth?values to these perfectly respectable sorts of hypotheses. In this paper, after examining three pragmatist attitudes towards bivalence, I shall suggest that the pragmatist's proper stance is to treat bivalence as a regulative assumption of inquiry
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DOI 10.1080/02698599008573356
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References found in this work BETA

3 What Science Aims to Do.Brian Ellis - 1985 - In P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. University of Chicago Press. pp. 48.
The Fortunes of Inquiry.Nicholas Jardine - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Critical Notice.Cheryl Misak - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):365-379.

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