International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):171 – 179 (1990)
Abstract The success of the pragmatic account of truth is often thought to founder on the principle of bivalence?the principle which holds that every genuine statement in the indicative mood is either true or false. For pragmatists must, it seems, claim that the principle does not hold for theoretical statements and observation statements about the past. That is, it seems that pragmatists must deny objective truth?values to these perfectly respectable sorts of hypotheses. In this paper, after examining three pragmatist attitudes towards bivalence, I shall suggest that the pragmatist's proper stance is to treat bivalence as a regulative assumption of inquiry
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals.Sean Allen Hermanson - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):669-690.
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