Self-Inquisitiveness: the Structure and Role of an Epistemic Virtue

Acta Analytica 33 (3):331-352 (2018)
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Abstract

The motivating virtue account claims that inquisitiveness or curiosity is the motivating epistemic virtue. In the case of self-knowledge, self-inquisitiveness, intrinsic and instrumental, is the motivating epistemic virtue that mobilizes other virtues, skills, and epistemic character virtues, needed to achieve such knowledge. Its proper object is substantial self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s dispositions and causal powers that has historically played a central role in philosophy, and is now, under various names, investigated by psychologists. It has been, until recently, comparatively neglected within analytical epistemology of self-knowledge. Self-inquisitiveness thus instantiates the general paradigm of curiosity-inquisitiveness that organizes and motivates other epistemic virtues. And it is perhaps responsible for intrinsic value of self-knowledge.

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Nenad Miščević
Central European University

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Achievement.Gwen Bradford - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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