Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth

Oxford University Press (2004)
C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. The pragmatic project spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. The existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.
Keywords Truth  Inquiry (Theory of knowledge  Vérité  Recherche (Théorie de la connaissance
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $10.88 used (90% off)   $41.35 new (22% off)   $53.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number B945.P44.M57 2004
ISBN(s) 0199270597   019824231X   9780199270590  
DOI 10.2307/2185663
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mathias Girel (2013). From Doubt to its Social Articulation: Pragmatist Insights. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (2):6-23.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

65 ( #75,029 of 1,924,998 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #212,000 of 1,924,998 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.