Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes

Synthese (4):1-28 (2019)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate the relevant attitude. I show this view can make sense of distinctive features of affective experiences, such as their valence and connection to value in a way which moves beyond current evaluativist views of affect.

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Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

Emotion: More Like Action Than Perception.Hichem Naar - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2715-2744.
Emotion as High-Level Perception.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7181-7201.
What “Values” Are Emotions About?Michael Milona - 2022 - A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, Edited by Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet and Fabrice Teroni.

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