Synthese (4):1-28 (2019)

Authors
Jonathan Mitchell
University of Manchester
Abstract
Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate the relevant attitude. I show this view can make sense of distinctive features of affective experiences, such as their valence and connection to value in a way which moves beyond current evaluativist views of affect.
Keywords Affect  Emotion  Pain  Attitude  Representation  Intentionality  Consciousness  Perception  Values
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

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Citations of this work BETA

Emotion as High-Level Perception.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.

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