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Contamination in reasoning about false belief: an instance of realist bias in adults but not children
Cognition 59 (1):1-21 (1996)
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Citations of this work
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription.Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task.Heather J. Ferguson, Ian Apperly, Jumana Ahmad, Markus Bindemann & James Cane - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):50-70.
Conversation, Gaze Coordination, and Beliefs About Visual Context.Daniel C. Richardson, Rick Dale & John M. Tomlinson - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (8):1468-1482.
References found in this work
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.
Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.
When representations conflict with reality: The preschooler's problem with false beliefs and “false” photographs.D. Zaitchik - 1990 - Cognition 35 (1):41-68.
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