Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111 (2018)

Authors
Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University
Abstract
Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also show that by accepting this thesis we can explain relevant features of evaluative understanding.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relational Imperativism About Affective Valence.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:341-371.
Nonconceptual Mental Content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Introspection of Emotions.Bertille De Vlieger & Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales

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Relational Imperativism About Affective Valence.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:341-371.

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