Philosophy of Science 62 (2):241-260 (1995)

Authors
Samuel Mitchell
Mount Holyoke College
Abstract
An amended bootstrapping can avoid Christensen's counterexamples. Earman and Edidin argue that Christensen's examples to bootstrapping rely on his failure to analyze background knowledge. I add an additional condition to bootstrapping that is motivated by Glymour's remarks on variety of evidence. I argue that it avoids the problems that the examples raise. I defend the modification against the charge that it is holistic, and that it collapses into Bayesianism.
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DOI 10.1086/289855
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