Dialectica 71 (1):57-84 (2017)

Authors
Jonathan Mitchell
University of Manchester
Abstract
This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two arguments which purport to show that emotional experience is not a source of reasons for evaluative belief. The first argument claims that because normative why-questions are always appropriate in the case of emotions, then emotions can never be conclusive reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs. The second purports to show that appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for evaluative beliefs renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot be self-justifying, they cannot provide any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs. This article responds to these arguments, and in doing so shows there is still much to be learned about the epistemology of emotional experience by drawing analogies with perceptual experience.
Keywords Emotion  Epistemology  Experience  Perceptual  Feeling  Value  Epistemic Perceptualism  Prima Facie  Reasons
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12171
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254.
Epistemic Emotions: The Case of Wonder.Laura Candiotto - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).

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