Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523 (2020)

Authors
Jonathan Mitchell
University of Manchester
Abstract
This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences.
Keywords emotion  perception  experience  intentionality  meta-emotion
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DOI 10.1017/can.2019.47
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References found in this work BETA

The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.
The Authority of Affect.Mark Johnston - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):181-214.

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