Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don't work

South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):139-150 (2008)

Veli Mitova
University of Johannesburg
Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications
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DOI 10.4314/sajpem.v27i2.31508
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