Theoria 2 (2):285-307 (1987)
AbstractThe logical theories of Stanislaw Leśniewski differ profoundly form classical formal systems. Unlike the latter, they do not have an entirely predetermined vocabulary. Nor do they have a determined list of functors of syntactical-semantical categories. Due to formalized directives for definitions, the logics of Leśniewski are constructed progressively, making new theses and consequently functors of new syntactical-semantical categories accesible. In this article we present the genetic aspect associated with these theses-definitions. We also show that the property of creativity makes it possible to bridge some of the fundamental gaps in contemporary classical logics
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