Feeling, Not Freedom: Nietzsche Against Agency
Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (2):256-274 (2016)
Abstract
Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, autonomy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his normative project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while endorsing morally substantial alternative conceptions of freedom, autonomy, and responsibility. I argue to the contrary that although Nietzsche’s rejection of...Author's Profile
DOI
10.5325/jnietstud.47.2.0256
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Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual.Ken Gemes - 2009 - In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.