An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction


Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure.
Keywords appearance/reality distinction   contextualism   skeptical hypotheses   knowledge closure   external world skepticism
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-00503001
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.

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