The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118 (2013)
In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
|Keywords||Michael Huemer Phenomenal Conservatism seemings justification appearances|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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