Against Phenomenal Conservatism

The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118 (2013)
Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, I outline a reductio against Phenomenal Conservatism. If sound, this reductio shows that the phenomenal conservative is committed to the claim that appealing to appearances is not a trustworthy method of fixing belief.
Keywords Michael Huemer  Phenomenal Conservatism  seemings  justification  appearances
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