Philosophia 40 (4):829-840 (2012)

Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
In this paper, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold for any S and any p.
Keywords epistemic norm  doxastic ought  ought implies can
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9389-y
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.
Knowledge and Evidence.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Problem of Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (4):425-436.
Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Boaz Miller - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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