Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?

Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the method of cases (namely, the method of using intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories) is not a reliable method of generating evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. In other words, the method of cases is unlikely to generate accurate judgments more often than not. This is so because, if perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then using intuition pumps to elicit intuitive judgments is like using illusions to elicit perceptual judgments. In both cases, judgments are made under bad epistemic circumstances
Keywords illusion  intuition  intuition pump  method of cases  intuitive appearance  intellectual seeming  sensory seeming
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-013-0164-1
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References found in this work BETA

The Metaphysics Within Physics.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

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