Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In my (2017a), I defend a view I call Weak Scientism, which is the view that knowledge produced by scientific disciplines is better than knowledge produced by non-scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge can be said to be quantitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as scientific disciplines produce more impactful knowledge–in the form of scholarly publications–than non-scientific disciplines (as measured by research output and research impact). Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar as such knowledge is explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more successful than non-scientific knowledge. Brown (2017a) raises several objections against my defense of Weak Scientism and I have replied to his objections (Mizrahi 2017b), thereby showing again that Weak Scientism is a defensible view. Since then, Brown (2017b) has reiterated his objections in another reply on SERRC. In this paper, I respond to Brown's objections, thereby showing once more that Weak Scientism is a defensible view.
Keywords inference to the best explanation  epistemological scientism  scientistic stance  strong scientism  weak scientism
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References found in this work BETA

Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.
Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Scientism Debate: A Battle for the Soul of Philosophy?Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (9):1-13.
Weak Scientism Defended Once More: A Reply to Wills.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (6):41-50.
Philosophical Sentiments Toward Scientism: A Reply to Bryant.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11):19-24.

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