More Intuition Mongering

The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6 (2013)
In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are weak arguments because intellectual intuition is an unreliable belief-forming process, since it yields incompatible verdicts in response to the same cases, and since the inference from 'It seems to S that p' to 'p' is unreliable. Since the reliability of intellectual intuition is a necessary condition for strong appeals to intuition, it follows that appeals to intuition are weak arguments.
Keywords appeal to intuition  intellectual seeming  argument  belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Moti Mizrahi, More Intuition Mongering
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Jennifer Mensch (2011). Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):431-453.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

375 ( #6,127 of 1,924,706 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

69 ( #3,945 of 1,924,706 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.