Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-defeat Arguments: A Reply to Huemer

Logos and Episteme 5 (3):343-350 (2014)

Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, I argue that Huemer’s reply does not save his Self-defeat Argument for PC from my original objection.
Keywords appearances  dogmatism  justification  phenomenal conservatism  seemings  self-defeat argument
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme2014537
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
Against Phenomenal Conservatism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (10):117-118.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-09-21

Total views
258 ( #20,964 of 2,325,859 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #13,424 of 2,325,859 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature