Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeat

Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110 (2014)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer’s Self-Defeat argument doesn’t uniquely motivate PC.
Keywords appearances  dogmatism  justification  phenomenal conservatism  seemings
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20145125
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