The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

Abstract
In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.
Keywords antirealism  argument from underconsideration  epistemic privilege  relative realism  scientific realism
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DOI 10.1080/02698595.2013.868183
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