Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.
Keywords antirealism  argument from underconsideration  epistemic privilege  relative realism  scientific realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1080/02698595.2013.868183
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 68 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.
The Argument From Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti‐Realism: A Defence.K. Brad Wray - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):317 – 326.
Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails.Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
Quinton's Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):393 - 400.
Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism.Sam Mitchell - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.
Platonism and Anti‐Platonism: Why Worry?Mary Leng - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-06-20

Total views
642 ( #12,424 of 2,507,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
112 ( #6,365 of 2,507,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes