Scientific Progress: Why Getting Closer to Truth is Not Enough

Authors
Moti Mizrahi
Florida Institute of Technology
Abstract
The aim of this discussion note is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the nature of scientific progress. I argue against the semantic view of scientific progress, according to which scientific progress consists in approximation to truth or increasing verisimilitude. If the semantic view of scientific progress were true, then scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories. Given that it is not the case that scientists would make scientific progress simply by arbitrarily adding true disjuncts to their hypotheses or theories, it follows that the semantic view of scientific progress is false.
Keywords scientific progress  truth  truthlikeness  verisimilitude
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