Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138 (2012)
| Abstract |
In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to yield independently testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success.
|
| Keywords | scientific realism anti-realism no-miracles argument inference to the best explanation |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.001 |
| Options |
Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
|
Download optionsOur Archive
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 27,613
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- linkinghub.elsevier.com (no proxy)
- philsci-archive.pitt.edu
(no proxy) - philsci-archive.pitt.edu [2] (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58.
Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (I).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.
View all 22 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.
Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument?Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (4):361-378.
View all 7 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articlesAbduction and Scientific Realism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:137-142.
Levin and Ghins on the “No Miracle” Argument and Naturalism.Mario Alai - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):85-110.
Hacking's Experimental Realism: An Untenable Middle Ground.Richard Reiner & Robert Pierson - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):60-69.
Why the No-Miracles Argument Fails.Carl Matheson - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):263 – 279.
Doing Away with the No Miracles Argument.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2013 - In Dennis Dieks & Vassilios Karakostas (eds.), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems. Springer.
Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism.Stathis Psillos - 2006 - In Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Springer. pp. 133--156.
Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.
Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell.Jacob Busch - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
The No-Miracles Argument, Reliabilism, and a Methodological Version of the Generality Problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.
Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument.Michael Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.
The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
Monthly downloads
Added to index
2011-12-09Total downloads
197 ( #21,359 of 2,168,955 )Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #49,748 of 2,168,955 )How can I increase my downloads?
My notes
Discussion
Nothing in this forum yet.
