Abstract Entities in the Causal Order

Theoria 76 (3):249-265 (2010)
This article discusses the argument we cannot have knowledge of abstract entities because they are not part of the causal order. The claim of this article is that the argument fails because of equivocation. Assume that the “causal order” is concerned with contingent facts involving time and space. Even if the existence of abstract entities is not contingent and does not involve time or space it does not follow that no truths about abstract entities are contingent or involve time or space. I argue that it is the latter which is required to obtain the desired conclusion
Keywords Platonism  abstract entities
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01074.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,641
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

71 ( #72,860 of 2,158,136 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #65,193 of 2,158,136 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums