Conhecimento testemunhal – A visão não reducionista

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 55 (2):126-143 (2010)
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In this essay we consider the possibility of knowledge being transferred or transmitted via testimony. Initially, we present an introduction to the epistemology of testimony, by indicating their origin in a tradition that has John Locke, David Hume and Thomas Reid as their representatives. We present a version of the non-reductionist thesis. We show that the non-reductionist about knowledge must request from the speaker a testimonial epistemic performance that is truth conductive, as well as intellectual integrity from the listener



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Felipe de Matos Müller
Federal University of Santa Catarina

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