In C. Martínez Vidal, U. Rivas Monroy & L. Villegas Forero (eds.), Verdad: Lógica, Representatión y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. pp. 95-104 (1996)
Abstract |
Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. The motivation in a link of understandability ans meaningful- ness suggests to change the above principle and to restrict the theory to logically simple sentences, in which case the paradox does not arise. This suggestion also allows to see the deep philosophical problems for anti-realism those counterexamples are pointing at.
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Keywords | Frederic Fitch Epistemic Paradox Truth Künne William D. Hart Fitch's Paradox knowability justifiability paradox verificationism anti-realism |
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References found in this work BETA
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference.David Bell & W. D. Hart - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 53:135-165.
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