Eine widerlegung der redundanztheorie der wahrheit

Abstract
Summary According to the Redundance Theory of Truth, the utterance it is true thatp means nothing more than simply ‘p’. So the utterance is true would be meaningless, redundant. The Redundance Theory overlooks that the the predicate true can be used in two applications: (a) as anassertion of the justness of a proposition, (b) as ajudgement of the justness of a proposition. (The word justness in this context means the correspondance of a proposition with reality according to the Theory of Correspondence.) The explicitassertion of the justness is indeed superfluous as it is implicitly included in the proposition. Thejudgement of the justness of a proposition, however, cannot be included in the proposition analytically. In this way, the utterance it is true thatp does not only mean ‘p’ but the assertion that is implicitly included in the proposition ‘p’ (= ‘p’ is true ) is true . Analogous: the utterance it is false that ‘p’ means the assertion that is implicitly included in the proposition ‘p’ (= ‘p’ is true ) is false . A judgement like this exceeds the content of a proposition and so cannot be redundant. Although in some context the words true and false may be used in their application an an assertion because of stylistic reasons, they are relevant for any theory of truth only in their application as a judgment, which cannot be contested by the reproach of redundance. The claim of the Redundance Theory that the concept of truth is meaningless and superfluous must be refused
Keywords Redundanztheorie  Wahrheit  Falschheit  Bejahung  Verneinung
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DOI 10.1007/BF01801251
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