Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):579–587 (2021)

Authors
Vincent C. Müller
Eindhoven University of Technology
Abstract
Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find the suggestions ultimately unmotivated, the discussion shows that our epistemic condition with respect to the moral status of others does raise problems, and that the human tendency to empathise with things that do not have moral status should be taken seriously—we suggest that it produces a “derived moral status”. Finally, it turns out that there is typically no individual in real AI that could even be said to be the bearer of moral status. Overall, there is no reason to think that robot rights are an issue now.
Keywords AI  AMA  Artificial moral agent  Derived moral status  Ethical behaviourism  Moral agent  Moral status  Relational turn
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10676-021-09596-w
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.Nick Bostrom (ed.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Welcoming Robots Into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Moral Status and Intelligent Robots.John-Stewart Gordon & David J. Gunkel - 2022 - Wiley: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):88-117.
Thinking Unwise: A Relational U-Turn.Nicholas Barrow - forthcoming - In Social Robots in Social Institutions: Proceedings of RoboPhilosophy 2022.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

When is a Robot a Moral Agent.John P. Sullins - 2006 - International Review of Information Ethics 6 (12):23-30.
On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents.Christopher Wareham - 2011 - International Journal of Technoethics 2 (1):35-42.
Welcoming Robots Into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.
The Grounds of Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
On the Notion of Moral Status and Personhood in Biomedical Ethics.Azam Golam - 2010 - The Dhaka Univrsity Studies 67 (1):83-96.
Personhood and Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2019 - In Antonia LoLordo (ed.), Persons: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 334-362.
Emerging Moral Status Issues. [REVIEW]Christopher Gyngell & Julian J. Koplin - 2020 - Monash Bioethics Review 38 (2):95-104.
Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties.Nicolas Delon - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379.
The Status of Moral Status.Benjamin Sachs - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):87-104.
The Moral Status of Children.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - In Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder & Jurgen De Wispelaere (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. Routledge Press. pp. 67-78.
Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-05-17

Total views
171 ( #68,509 of 2,506,051 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
83 ( #9,329 of 2,506,051 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes