New developments in the philosophy of AI

In Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence. Springer (2016)
Abstract
The philosophy of AI has seen some changes, in particular: 1) AI moves away from cognitive science, and 2) the long term risks of AI now appear to be a worthy concern. In this context, the classical central concerns – such as the relation of cognition and computation, embodiment, intelligence & rationality, and information – will regain urgency.
Keywords philosophy of AI  philosophy of artificial intelligence  cognitive science  AI risk  computation  embodiment  rationality
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