What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be

Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195 (2016)

Abstract

I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-12

Downloads
989 (#6,737)

6 months
74 (#10,107)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

The Morality of Happiness.Julia Annas - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle's First Principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics with Aristotle.Sarah Broadie - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle on learning to be good.Myles F. Burnyeat - 1980 - In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 69--92.

View all 86 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Aristotle on Prohairesis.Liu Wei - 2016 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 18 (2):50-74.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.
Common Sense and the Theory of Human Behaviour.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):526-543.
Ethical Case Deliberation and Decision Making.Diego Gracia - 2003 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 6 (3):227-233.