Which symbol grounding problem should we try to solve?

Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 27 (1):73-78 (2015)
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Abstract

Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition of “zero semantic commitment” for solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to it. I argue briefly that their condition cannot be fulfilled, not even by their own solution. After a look at Luc Steels' very different competing suggestion, I suggest that we need to re-think what the problem is and what role the ‘goals’ in a system play in formulating the problem. On the basis of a proper understanding of computing, I come to the conclusion that the only sensible ground-ing problem is how we can explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function of meaning in artificial computational agents

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Vincent C. Müller
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
The philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.

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