Sorites 20:43-48 (2008)

Robert Adams characterizes actualism regarding possible worlds as «the view that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be nonactual possible worlds, they must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things which there are in the actual world, and which are not identical with nonactual possibles.» In this paper, I will briefly explain actualism about possible worlds, showing that an essential pillar of the theory is the claim that truth is distinct from, and ontologically prior to, truth in a world. The rest of the paper is premised on the idea that an interesting philosophical defense of this claim calls for an analysis of truth itself, and is not intended as an objection to actualism, but rather to underscore the interest actualists should have in the question of what truth is. First, I will consider the idea, drawn from Adams and Alan McMichael, that truth differs from truth in a world in its being a matter of correspondence between a proposition and an independent object; that object being, in McMichael's words, the `concrete universe'. Then, I will show that, given such an analysis of truth, the truth conditions for propositions about non-actual possibilities violate the central tenet of actualism, as articulated by Adams
Keywords actualism  possible worlds  truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Inner and Outer Truth.Iris Einheuser - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
True At. [REVIEW]Scott Soames - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):124 - 133.
A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds.Alan McMichael - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):49-66.
Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism.James O. Young - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence.Mark A. Wrathall - 1999 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):69 – 88.
The Value of Truth.Dimitar G. Ivanov - 2012 - Romanian Journal of Analyitic Philosophy (1):37-54.
Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
Does the Actual World Actually Exist?Paul McNamara - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (1):59 - 81.
Truthmakers Without Truth.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2):53–71.
On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.Jeff Speaks - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.
How Truth Depends Upon Being.Fraser MacBride - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):370-378.


Added to PP index

Total views
93 ( #117,383 of 2,455,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #44,850 of 2,455,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes