Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):577-594 (2015)

Authors
Michael Moehler
Virginia Tech
Abstract
In a recent article, McClennen (2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected individual utility maximizing behavior that underlies the Nash bargaining model in favor of what he calls full rationality, and McClennen’s full cooperation bargaining theory demands that agents select the most egalitarian strictly Pareto-optimal distributional outcome that is strictly Pareto-superior to the state of nature. I argue that McClennen’s full cooperators are best described as reasonable agents whose rationality is constrained by moral considerations and that McClennen’s bargaining theory is moralized in this regard. If, by contrast, the orthodox concept of rationality is assumed and plausible assumptions are made about human nature and social cooperation, then a modified version of the standard Nash bargaining solution, which I call the stabilized Nash bargaining solution (Moehler 2010), is justified. From the perspective of rational agents, the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can accommodate McClennen’s criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution in the context of the social contract and, for such agents, it can serve as a principle of distributive justice in deeply morally pluralistic societies
Keywords Full rationality  Reasonableness  Equality  Instrumental rationality   Pareto-optimality   Nash bargaining solution
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Leviathan.Thomas Hobbes - 1651 - Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Convention, correlation and consistency.Justin P. Bruner - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1707-1718.
Orthodox Rational Choice Contractarianism: Before and After Gauthier.Michael Moehler - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (2):113-131.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rational Cooperation.Edward McClennen - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):65-93.
Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice.John Thrasher - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699.
Loss Aversion and Bargaining.Jonathan Shalev - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (3):201-232.
Distributive Justice and the Nash Bargaining Solution.Christopher D. Proulx - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
Contractiarianism and Bargaining Theory.Paul Weirich - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:369-385.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-10-14

Total views
61 ( #176,785 of 2,454,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #303,745 of 2,454,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes