Utilitas 22 (4):447-473 (2010)

Authors
Michael Moehler
Virginia Tech
Abstract
It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form 'each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power'. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls' original position.
Keywords Contractualism  Rationality  Reasonableness  Stabilized Nash bargaining solution
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820810000348
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References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View.Michael Moehler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):82-99.
Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice.John Thrasher - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):683-699.

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Contractiarianism and Bargaining Theory.Paul Weirich - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:369-385.
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