Alternate Accounts of Rationality Invalidate Kaposy's Argument

American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):43-44 (2010)
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Abstract

Kaposy (2010) argues that contemporary neuroscience cannot provide rational reasons for abandoning folk psychological concepts like self, personhood, or free will because these concepts are necessa...

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Barton Moffatt
Mississippi State University

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References found in this work

The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.
Proofs and Refutations.Imre Lakatos - 1980 - Noûs 14 (3):474-478.

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