Constructing Attitudes

ProtoSociology 21:105-128 (2005)
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Abstract

The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique that-clauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be nonargument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invokes a construction-based grammatical theory. Such an approach challenges traditional views of semantic compositionality by rejecting a central dogma of semantics, namely, that linguistic constructions contribute only trivial logical or quasi-logical information to semantic interpretation (e.g., function-application relations).

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Marc Moffett
University of Texas at El Paso

Citations of this work

Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Propositions.Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons and that‐clauses.James Pryor - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
Knowledge Ascription by Grammatical Construction.Laura A. Michaelis - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 261.

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