Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a (2017)

Authors
Andreas Mogensen
Oxford University
Abstract
Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases of contingency anxiety involve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting this Disagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant in determining whether to revise our beliefs. I show that each of these problems can be successfully accommodated by the Disagreement Hypothesis.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12099
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,323
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
Set-Theoretic Pluralism and the Benacerraf Problem.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2013-2030.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Religious Diversity and Disagreement.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 185-195.
Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.
Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):11-28.
Epistemologia różnicy zdań.Celina Głogowska - 2014 - Filo-Sofija 14 (27):129-140.
A Puzzle About Belief Updating.Carlo Martini - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.
The Problem of Contingency for Religious Belief.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (4):371-392.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-09-23

Total views
122 ( #87,464 of 2,448,736 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #301,105 of 2,448,736 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes