Different Readings of Isfahani’s Argument for the Existence of God

پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 15 (2):167-183 (2018)
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Abstract

Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Gharawi Isfahani presented an argument for the existence of God which is classified among ontological arguments. Among contemporary thinkers in Iran, this argument has attracted serious supporters and critics alike. Overall, five readings have been put forth for this argument. In the present study, these five readings have been analyzed in three main frameworks including the concept of the Necessary Being as a mental concept, the concept of Necessary Being as representing something out of itself and finally, the reality of the Necessary Being or the objectivity of the Being by Itself. After presenting each reading, its compatibility with Isfahani’s argument will be analyzed. It will be shown that Isfahani’s argument should be regarded as an argument in the second framework.

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