Stochastic Stability and Disagreements Between Dynamics

Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)

Authors
Aydin Mohseni
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
The replicator dynamics and Moran process are the main deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory. These models are connected by a mean-field relationship—the former describes the expected behavior of the latter. However, there are conditions under which their predictions diverge. I demonstrate that the divergence between their predictions is a function of standard techniques used in their analysis, and of differences in the idealizations involved in each. My analysis reveals problems for stochastic stability analysis in a broad class of games. I also demonstrate a novel domain of agreement between the dynamics, and draw a broader methodological moral for evolutionary modeling.
Keywords game theory  evolutionary game theory  replicator dynamics  Moran process  stochastic stability
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/703581
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,566
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Uniform Barriers and Evolutionarily Stable Sets.Immanuel Bomze - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:225-243.
Microscopic Foundation of Stochastic Game Dynamical Equations.Dirk Helbing - 1998 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5:211-224.
Classical Versus Evolutionary Game Theory.Herbert Gintis - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):1-2.
Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:374-394.
Chaos in Game Dynamics.Brian Skyrms - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130.
Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour.Fernando Vega-Redondo (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-10-28

Total views
5 ( #920,448 of 2,325,500 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #332,020 of 2,325,500 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature