The Role of Predictions, Their Confirmation, and Reward in Maintaining the Self-Concept

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16:824085 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The predictive processing framework posits that people continuously use predictive principles when interacting with, learning from, and interpreting their surroundings. Here, we suggest that the same framework may help explain how people process self-relevant knowledge and maintain a stable and positive self-concept. Specifically, we recast two prominent self-relevant motivations, self-verification and self-enhancement, in predictive processing (PP) terms. We suggest that these self-relevant motivations interact with the self-concept (i.e., priors) to create strong predictions. These predictions, in turn, influence how people interpret information about themselves. In particular, we argue that these strong self-relevant predictions dictate how prediction error, the deviation from the original prediction, is processed. In contrast to many implementations of the PP framework, we suggest that predictions and priors emanating from stable constructs (such as the self-concept) cultivate belief-maintaining, rather than belief-updating, dynamics. Based on recent findings, we also postulate that evidence supporting a predicted model of the self (or interpreted as such) triggers subjective reward responses, potentially reinforcing existing beliefs. Characterizing the role of rewards in self-belief maintenance and reframing self-relevant motivations and rewards in predictive processing terms offers novel insights into how the self is maintained in neurotypical adults, as well as in pathological populations, potentially pointing to therapeutic implications.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions.Stephen G. Brush - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:133 - 145.
Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation.Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:87-96.
Models and Inferences in Science.Richard Dawid - 2016 - In Emiliano Ippoliti, Fabio Sterpetti & Thomas Nickles (eds.), Models and Inferences in Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 191-205.
Herapel and Instantial Confirmation.P. H. Wiebe - 1976 - Philosophy Research Archives 2:59-70.
Theories and the transitivity of confirmation.Mary Hesse - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63.
Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.
Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
Delimiting the Unconceived.Richard Dawid - 2018 - Foundations of Physics 48 (5):492-506.
Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-10

Downloads
6 (#1,481,650)

6 months
1 (#1,511,647)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
New directions in predictive processing.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):209-223.
Animal intelligence.Edward L. Thorndike - 1899 - Psych Revmonog 8 (2):207-208.

View all 12 references / Add more references